Fracking Wars: The Role of Activism

In 2001, Devon Energy Corporation combined hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling to achieve the technique of shale gas fracking (Layzer 465). Fracking created “low, stable natural gas prices,” and as this method gained popularity, “shale gas accounted for 40 percent of total U.S. gas production” in 2013 (Layzer 465). Ultimately, New York, Vermont, and Maryland proved themselves to be “laboratories of democracy” as statewide fracking was banned due to the “environment, health, and quality of life” arguments of antifracking advocates on the environmentalist side of the fracking wars (Layzer 463). These negative effects, accused antifracking advocates, were the result of industry’s unsafe and inequitable fracking operations. Environmentalists claimed that the solution was to enact policies that banned fracking. The cost of inaction would be a greater release of methane, which would contribute to global climate change and declining public health. If fracking continued, local water supplies would be threatened, drinking water would be contaminated, minor earthquakes would occur, locals would be exposed to radioactivity, and the air would become increasingly more polluted (Layzer 465-466). On top of that, truck traffic would create hazardous driving conditions and residential  areas would experience “noise, light pollution, and odors” and an industrialized landscape (Layzer 467), not to mention an increased rate of crime (Layzer 482). Although the environmentalist’s use of Layzer’s Three Step Model had considerable weight on the outcome of the fracking wars, activism was the most influential factor due to locals pressuring for policy change, celebrities bolstering support through significant media coverage, and industry leaders publicly disagreeing with the practice of fracking. 

Antifracking activists were able to raise red flags on negative impacts that had originally been overlooked, sparking policy entrepreneurship to address these issues. Under the EPA in 1978, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) had not regulated oil and gas waste (Layzer 468). However, growing local concern in fracking areas resulted in a 2011 report by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce that revealed that “leading companies were using fracking fluids that contained 750 compounds, of which more than 650 were known human carcinogens or air pollutants” (Layzer 468). From this information, the energy secretary under the Obama administration, Steven Chu, “appointed a seven-member panel of scientific and environmental experts to make recommendations on how fracking could be done more safely and cleanly” within the same year (Layzer 468). In April 2012, the EPA followed up and mandated that new facilities “capture up to 95 percent of the volatile organic compounds (VOCs) emitted by fracked wells” (Layzer 469). Around the same time, Marie McRae, a farmer from Dryden, New York, was forced to sign a lease for fracking land. She helped found the Dryden Resources Awareness Coalition (DRAC), which hired lawyers who discovered that “under their home-rule authority, they could use local zoning laws to prohibit oil and gas activities altogether” (Layzer 478). In 2010, DRAC members accumulated 1,600 signatures against fracking, which was “enough to make or break an election for a town board member” (Layzer 479). When it came time to vote in August, “the town board unanimously passed a series of zoning amendments that prohibited oil and gas exploration, extraction, storage, treatment, disposal, and ‘support activities’” (Layzer 479). Although Layzer’s framing model could influence public awareness of the hazards of fracking, it was the actions of locals that initiated policy change. 

Josh Fox, a filmmaker from Pennsylvania, caught wind of a major fracking scandal after it was covered by “Vanity Fair, Discover, Forbes, 60 Minutes, The New York Times, CNN, and NBC Nightly News” (Layzer 472). It was July 2008 in Dimock, Pennsylvania, when multiple incidents of trucks crashing into storage tanks occurred, causing hundreds of gallons of diesel fuel to spill out. In September of the same year, residents’ drinking water turned brown right after a gas well was built by their homes. Then, a well outright exploded (Layzer 472). At the time that the residents of Dimock signed their leases, they “lacked the information that would later become available on the economics, environmental consequences, and other aspects of fracking” (Layzer 471). Dimock residents were able to successfully sue Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation, the company responsible, with the accusation of “fraudulently asserting that the drilling process used in fracking could not contaminate groundwater and posed no threat to the people who lived there” (Layzer 472). Cabot was able to build a water pipeline and pay its way out of the mess before continuing to complete pre-existing wells, but not new ones. In Fox’s documentary, Gasland, the excessive amount of water usage, undisclosed chemicals used, and astonishing number of truck hauling trips involved in the fracking process were unveiled. Interviews of the challenges faced by residents were included, with one man who “lit his tap water on fire” (Layzer 473). With fracking becoming a highly salient issue, celebrities got on board with antifracking advocacy and attended antifracking rallies (Layzer 475). All of this commotion was further able to sway the positions of industry leaders.

Layzer’s model of framing environmental issues can only go so far with support from environmentalists and the public. In this case, “Anthony Ingraffea, an engineering professor at Cornell who boasted decades of experience with oil and gas development, became a vocal antifracking advocate” (Layzer 475). In 2010, he utilized YouTube and public presentations to describe “the process of drilling a fracking well and what could go wrong” (Layzer 475). Ingraffea blatantly called out “industry public relations campaigns as inaccurate and insincere and argued that large-scale gas drilling was incompatible with the economy of upstate New York, which relies heavily on agriculture, tourism, and recreation” (Layzer 475). Around the same time, Chip Northrup, an investor, joined forces with a professional team, including industry leaders and a geologist, to emphasize “that the terrain in New York was… far more inhospitable to fracking–more vulnerable to groundwater contamination.” They did an additional analysis, which showed “that the natural gas potential of the Southern Tier was well below industry estimates” (Layzer 475). These objective evaluations by industry leaders undermined the claims to economic growth and security offered by major fracking companies. 

If Layzer’s framing model were the most important factor in determining how the case played out, fracking advocates would have blown the cost and benefit analysis out of the water to secure unhindered fracking operations. They brought up the fact that “drilling in Pennsylvania had created 44,000 jobs and had a $1.8 billion impact” (Layzer 475), with lawyers warning that New York landowners could not afford to turn away fracking deals. A member from the Joint Landowners Coalition of NY stated, “NY uses more natural gas than any other state except CA and TX. But it imports 95 percent of it” (Layzer 477). In other words, banning fracking would decrease energy security in New York. Fracking advocates even played with an eco-conscious facade, concluding that “U.S. carbon emissions fell by about 12 percent between 2007 and 2012, a decline… attributed mainly to a widespread shift from coal to natural gas” (Layzer 467). The antifracking movement faced strong opposition as many rural farmers struggled financially and could use the million dollar deals offered by the fracking industry. Despite this attractive argument, antifracking advocacy was powerful and supported by contradictory arguments from industrial leaders. People quickly realized they could not accept being paid to withstand life threatening health effects and stepped up to demand policy change. 

The fracking wars traditionally would have been another environmental failure if Layzer’s Three Step Model held the most weight in swaying politicians. Fracking advocates offered immense financial relief to poor farmers and entire states. In the beginning, they were able to use scientific uncertainty around the effects of fracking and delay further inspection. Antifracking advocates were not able to offer a single financial solution, which is a pivotal aspect of Layzer’s framing model. However, through the activism of affected locals, popular figures in media, and even industry leaders who converted to the environmentalist side, politicians underwent extreme pressure to re-evaluate the lack of policies surrounding fracking operations. Without these key players in the fracking wars, the state of public livelihood and environmental wellbeing as it is today would be an entirely reversed story; but there is still more work to be done.

Works Cited

Layzer, Judith A., and Sara R. Rinfret. The Environmental Case: Translating Values into Policy. CQ Press, an Imprint of SAGE Publications, Inc, 2020.